

Georgia 2024 Parliamentary Elections

Does my vote matter?

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Purpose of the Document

Purpose of the document

Based on the extensive review and deep analysis of all available local and international sources and data, the present document has the purpose to:

- **Compile all available analysis and evaluations** of parliamentary elections of October 26 in Georgia.
- **Provide a systematic assessment** of parliamentary elections **in view of fraud and falsification** based on the existing data.
- **Document and explain**
 - **if and at what scale election rigging took place** and
 - what methods were used for this purpose.
- Propose next steps to restore stability in the country and prevent further escalation of the political crisis.

Evaluations, data and analysis reviewed

With the purpose of analysing the process as well as results of the parliamentary elections of October 26, 2024, the present document relies on and draws from a detailed review of the following sources:

- All reputable evaluations of elections by international and Georgian organisations and observers
- Analysis of election results based on internationally accepted election methodology
- Statistical data of the electorate as well as voting results
- Detailed analysis of lawsuits and complaints filed at Georgian courts as well as at the Central Election Commission
- Detailed review of exit polls and surveys and their discrepancy with election results
- Reactions by international partners, politicians and analysts regarding the results of the elections
- Media reports
- Analytical articles

Main Findings & Conclusions

Based on a detailed review and analysis of the 2024 Georgian parliamentary elections, the following conclusions can be drawn:

- **Elections were not free and fair**: Parliamentary elections of October 2024 in Georgia have not been qualified as “free and fair” by any of the reputable international and local organisations and Georgia’s international partners.
- **Large discrepancies between exit polls and official election results**: This discrepancy raises additional doubts about how free and fair the elections were. 13% discrepancy in case of Edison Research and 12% in case of HarrisX, according to the opinion of these companies (based on the post-election audit), “cannot be explained” and is “statistically impossible.”
- **Georgian Dream (GD) electoral ‘victory’ was achieved mostly through election fraud**: Despite the extensive misuse of administrative resources by the ruling party, ‘victory’ in the elections could not have been achieved without rigging, and the Georgian Dream would have achieved approximately the same results - with some minor deviations - as documented in the exit poll results (42-44%).
- **Abnormal turnout of male and female voters**:
 - According to International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), “the difference between turnout rates of male and female voters at a significant number of polling stations deviates from the normal distribution and exhibits practically improbable characteristics”. More specifically, at 23 polling stations the number of actual male voters exceeded the number of registered male voters.
 - Based on the analysis of actual gender-disaggregated voting results (published officially by the Central Election Commission), in 2024 the difference between female and male turnout is unusual compared to the 2020 and 2016 elections, namely the number of male voters in 2024 substantially exceed the number of female voters while in previous elections this difference was in favor of female voters.
 - Importantly, this difference broadly coincides with the unexplained statistical variance of over 8% (172,523 votes) identified by the exit poll company HarrisX in their post-election audit and indicates that excessive male turnout can be explained by the existence of carousel methods of voting.

Main Findings & Conclusions (cont.)

- **Statistical analysis creates grounds for legitimate doubts about rigging**
 - Statistical extrapolation of voting distribution by experts, based on the widely used model for assessing the degree of how free and fair elections are, **reveals deviations from normal voting patterns and raises legitimate doubts about rigging.**
 - According to estimates of an independent election observer and data analyst (Roman Udot), **the scale of distortions in the 2024 elections is 300,000 votes in favor of the Georgian Dream.**
- **Systemic and repeated nature of violations**: In total over 4,500 claims about election violations were filed by observers at polling stations. Out of these, 1,479 claims were reviewed at the Election Commission district level and/or court level. **Analysis of these claims revealed that violations occurred at 72% of polling stations and 85% of these violations were of systemic or repeated nature. Only 5% of claims – of minor importance and not having an impact on the election results - have been fully satisfied at the Central Election Commission (CEC) level.** It should be noted, that the **vast majority (about 70%) of claims filed at the polling stations, have not been reviewed, or have been rejected after questioning only the chairman of the precinct election commission, or without questioning anyone at all.**
- **Fundamental constitutional right to vote freely was compromised heavily as vote secrecy was not guaranteed** (Article 37 of Constitution of Georgia):
 - Preliminary conclusions made by the **OSCE/ODIHR indicate that „vote secrecy was potentially compromised in 24% of observations“.**
 - According to the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association (GYLA), **in all polling stations, where voting was conducted electronically, ballot secrecy was compromised as the paper used for machine voting was very thin and the marking showing the voter's choice could be well identified by observers. Transparency of ballots further aggravated the consequences of the practice of intimidation as voters were afraid to vote freely.** GYLA requested annulment of results from **all 2,263 electronic polling stations, which represents 75% of the total 3,111 precincts and covers some 90% of the electorate,*** but the second instance court ultimately rejected the claim.

Main Findings & Conclusions *(cont.)*

- **Issues with electronic voting machines**: Electronic voting machines produced by Smartmatic lacked important functions such as face and fingerprint recognition, which guarantee transparency and fairness in the elections, and were equipped with USB ports, which **raise doubts about possible hacking practices**. This in turn raises suspicion about possible rigging practices. Moreover, as reported by ISFED, **the number of male voters exceeded the number of registered male voters in 2 electronic polling stations too** (out of total 23 mentioned above), which also raises suspicion **about the use of electronic voting machines for manipulation purposes**.
- **Issues with voting markers**: Voting markers used in voting trainings prior to elections on the one hand and on the election day on the other hand were different. Based on the procurement contract between the CEC and Smartmatic, markers should be manufactured and supplied by Smartmatic. Markers used in the election trainings were branded, while there is no proof available that markers used on the election day were produced by Smartmatic as they had a different shape and were not branded. A combination of improper paper and suspicious marker **raises serious doubts whether there was a purposeful effort of violation of vote secrecy**.
- **Voting irregularities in polling stations abroad**: Substantial part of Georgians residing abroad were not able to vote because they were unable to register, polling stations were not open by the election commission in several tens of locations irrespective of sufficient amount of voters present, there was a lack of registrars and thus long queues at polling stations.
- **Video footage and journalistic investigations provide evidence of election fraud**: Journalistic investigation has uncovered significant electoral fraud and manipulation practice in Georgia's October 2024 parliamentary elections, including **fraudulent voting** in empty villages, **voter intimidation**, **vote-buying**, and **misuse of government resources**. Persons involved in election fraud have given public interviews about how they participated in election fraud.*

*Video materials are available here: [TV Pirveli](#); [TV Pirveli](#); [georgiaelections2024](#); [Coalition 4 Change](#)

Main Findings & Conclusions (cont.)

- **Whistleblower confessions**: A **whistleblower**, who participated in election fraud in favor of Georgian Dream has publicly described how he and three other people traveled to different villages in the Gori municipality by car and voted using other people's IDs. He himself voted at approximately **30 polling stations, and by doing so, directly participated in the carousel voting scheme**. As the whistleblower reported, **a total of 120-130 cars were operating under this scheme, meaning that about 500 persons took part in carousel voting in the Gori municipality alone**. Based on the information provided by the whistleblower, it can be assumed that **at least 15,000 votes for Georgian Dream were illegally obtained through this scheme in the Gori municipality alone**.*
*Source: [TV Mtavari](#)
- **All branches of power were involved in election rigging**: Based on the analysis of the whole election process (prior and during the elections) all branches of power participated in election rigging, including the central government (e.g. Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Education), local government bodies, Parliament, National Bank of Georgia, Central Election Commission and Courts. This indicates that **election fraud and violation schemes were planned and organized with the use of administrative resources** – financial, human and technical.
- **Russian interference**: It is reasonable to have **suspicious about Russian interference in the election process**. Various reputable international media outlets and investigative journalists have reported about Russia's involvement in the 2024 elections. Among others:
 - Bloomberg reported that **Russian spies have monitored Georgian government structures and major companies for years**, gathering data for potential sabotage of critical infrastructure.
 - Investigative journalist at Bellingcat, Christo Grozev, said that **Russian intelligence had plans to interfere in the Georgian elections**.
 - St. Petersburg media manager, **Alexander Malkevich, who is sanctioned by several countries** (including the USA and Ukraine) for illegal activities and Russian propaganda, **was in Tbilisi for several days during the elections as an accredited (by CEC) observer**.

Main Findings & Conclusions *(cont.)*

- **No impartial investigation possible in Georgia**: The outcome of court discussions clearly revealed that no impartial investigation of alleged election fraud is possible in Georgia as all government institutions and courts are controlled by the ruling Georgian Dream party.
- **Strong case for international investigation**: Available data and proofs of fraud form a very strong case for **an international, impartial and independent investigation in order to establish if, how and at what scale elections were falsified in Georgia**.
 - **The European Union**: Notably, on November 18, after the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Vice-President of the European Commission Josep Borrell announced that the EU will send a mission to Georgia, over concerns about alleged fraud in the October 26 parliamentary elections. **The EU investigation is important in order to assess whether the standards for “free and fair” elections were met in the 2024 elections, taking into account Georgia’s EU candidate status and the EU’s 4th recommendation (out of 9) on ensuring “free and fair” elections.**
 - **OSCE/ODIHR**: OSCE/ODIHR could start investigation in order to identify possible election rigging by **comparing voter ID numbers stored in electronic voting machines with ID numbers of registered voters at polling stations, and a direct survey of a selected number of voters** (for identification of accuracy of voting).
 - **The United States**: The US could start investigation and conduct **IT and technical audits of Smartmatic’s electronic voting machines** to identify their possible use for election fraud.

Main Findings & Conclusions *(cont.)*

Post-election developments

- **Constitutional lawsuits:** Soon after the CEC published a summary report of the 2024 parliamentary elections (on November 16, 2024), the President of Georgia and opposition members of the parliament filed constitutional lawsuits:
 - On November 19, **the President of Georgia, Salome Zurbishvili, filed a lawsuit demanding that the final results of the parliamentary election be declared unconstitutional on the grounds of violation of the principles of universality and secrecy of elections.** On November 21, **30 opposition members of parliament** filed a lawsuit at the Constitutional Court demanding that the elections be declared unconstitutional.
 - Both lawsuits were rejected by the Constitutional Court.
- **New parliament convened in breach of Constitution:** The ruling GD party held the first session of the “new” parliament on November 25th, 2024 in breach of the Constitution as the President had not convened the first session. Thus the **GD violated the Article 38 of the Constitution**, according to which **“the first meeting of Parliament is called by the President.”** In addition to this, appointment of the first session of the “new” parliament was illegal because of the **two lawsuits at the Constitutional Court** by the President and by 30 opposition members of the parliament - still pending at that moment - requesting declaration of elections as unconstitutional.
- **The Declaration of EU Parliament:** **On November 28, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution, stating that “the Georgian parliamentary elections must be re-run under international supervision”.** The EU Parliament calls for sanctions against high-level officials and states that “Policies pursued by the Georgian government are incompatible with the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration prospects”. The EU Parliament does not recognize the 2024 Georgian parliamentary elections and calls on the international community to do the same. The list of persons to be sanctioned includes Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, Mayor of Tbilisi and Secretary General of Georgian Dream Kakha Kaladze, Speaker of the Georgian Parliament Shalva Papuashvili and former Prime Minister and oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili.

Responses to Some Frequently Raised Issues

Below are responses/explanations of some key questions, raised by international observers and Georgia's partners. More specifically, responses cover two questions:

1. Signature of summary protocols of election results by opposition election commission members
2. Claims submitted to election commissions and courts by opposition parties

1. Signature of summary protocols of opposition members

Question: Does the signature of final protocols of voting results by election commission members mean that all signatories confirm the results?

Response: Signature of final protocols of voting results by members of an election commission, including those appointed by the opposition, does not mean that they confirm voting results.

More details:

According to Paragraph 20, Article 8 of Election Code of Georgia - "Election commission rules of operation" - a District Election Commission (DEC) or Precinct Election Commission (PEC) member "**is obliged to sign a summary protocol** of polling or election results. If the DEC or PEC member disagrees with the information reflected in the protocol, he/she may indicate this in the respective section of the summary protocol of polling and election results and attach a **written dissenting opinion** to the protocol. **In the case of dissenting opinion, the DEC or PEC member is obliged to sign the summary protocol** of the voting results in the appropriate section for the signature of the commission member." By signing the protocol a member of the DEC or PEC **does not confirm the objectivity or accuracy of the results**, but rather **affirms that he/she was present during** the period of summarizing the results in the protocol (as evidenced by his/her signature). Failure to sign a summary protocol by a DEC/PEC member is a violation of legislative requirements and respectively, a commission member could face disciplinary or other forms of penalties (including financial penalties).

Reportedly, the largest majority of the opposition parties/coalitions, represented in the election commissions, which passed the electoral threshold of 5%, submitted a dissenting opinion in the District Election Commissions. More specifically, commission members of Unity – National Movement as well as Strong Georgia – Lelo For People, For Liberty submitted dissenting opinions in almost all districts whereby Coalition for Changes Gvaramia Melia Girchi Ddoa did not have representatives in election commissions.

Responses on Some Frequently Raised Issues

2. Claims submitted to election commissions and courts by opposition parties

Question: Are there claims filed by opposition parties/coalitions, which passed the electoral threshold of 5% but do not acknowledge the results of elections?

Response: Based on the publicly available official statistics published by the CEC,* out of the total number of claims - 1,657, as of 21.11.2024 - on violations during the 2024 parliamentary elections, which were advanced to district election commissions, the Central Election Commission (CEC), or the first and second-instance courts, about 48% were filed by the registered election subjects i.e. political parties/coalitions. The rest was filed by observers and various organizations.

More details:

98% of all claims submitted by political parties/coalitions have been submitted by those opposition parties/coalitions, which passed the electoral threshold of 5% but do not acknowledge the results of elections: 1. Coalition for Changes Gvaramia Melia Girchi Droa, 2. Unity – National Movement, 3. Strong Georgia – Lelo For People, For Liberty and 4. Gakharia For Georgia.

*Official statistics of claims are available on the webpage <https://sachivrebi.cec.gov.ge/#/>

Exit-polls vs Election Results

Summary


- **Large discrepancies exist** between exit polls, conducted by two **reputable US companies**, Edison Research and HarrisX, and **election results published by the Central Election Commission (CEC)**, which raise additional **doubts about how free and fair the elections were**.
- **13%** discrepancy in case of Edison Research and **12%** in case of HarrisX, according to the opinion of these companies (based on the post-election audit), **“cannot be explained” and is “statistically impossible”**.
- According to HarrisX, out of 12% discrepancy **„8% or 172,523 votes - cannot be substantiated by statistical variance, pointing to possible voting irregularities“**.

Exit Poll Results

Large discrepancies between exit polls and announced election results in 2024 parliamentary elections

- Two highly reputable American companies, Edison Research and HarrisX, have conducted exit polls during 2024 elections, and in both cases there are large discrepancies between the results of exit polls and official results published by the Central Election Commission (CEC).

Results of Georgian Dream Party



- Discrepancy between Edison Research and CEC results is 13%.
- According to Edison Research, **“the 13-point difference between Edison’s estimate and the official result of 54% for Georgian Dream cannot be explained by normal variation alone and suggests local-level manipulation of the vote.”**

Source: [Edison Research](#)



- Discrepancy between HarrisX and CEC results is 12%.
- According to HarrisX, this difference **“is statistically impossible, even when the Exit Poll data is adjusted to reflect the full data parameters published by the CEC”**

Source: [HarrisX](#)

HarrisX - a leading public opinion research, data analytics, and strategy consulting company in the US, the most accurate pollster of the 2020 U.S. presidential election as rated by the Washington Post

Post-Election Exit Poll Analysis by HarrisX & Edison Research

Post-election analysis by both polling companies - HarrisX and Edison Research - reveal significant statistical discrepancies, which cannot be explained by statistical variance and suggest election irregularities.

- On election day, HarrisX surveyed 12,007 voters (with a margin of error of +/- 0.9%). When 1,9 million voters participate in the elections in Georgia on average, according to HarrisX this sample is quite large and **substantially enhances the accuracy of the polling results**, considering that in the US with the population of 100 times larger than the population of Georgia, exit poll survey as a rule covers 15,000 voters.
- “A discrepancy of over **8% of the total votes cast, or 172,523 votes**, across the country that **cannot be explained by statistical variance, pointing to possible voting irregularities**” (total discrepancy equals to 12%).
- HarrisX identified “**27 electoral districts** (out of 73 in Georgia, excluding occupied regions and overseas voting centers) **with significant discrepancies** between the exit poll and CEC results.”
- As stated by HarrisX “in the district of Marneuli, the Georgian Dream party won **48% of the vote in the 2020** parliamentary election. According to the Harris X exit poll, Georgian Dream **won 40%** of the Marneuli vote in the 2024 election, **but The CEC reports Georgian Dream receiving 80%** of the vote. **A variance of 40% between the HarrisX exit poll data and the official CEC data in Marneuli is both improbable and impossible.**”
- “Even when the Exit Poll data is adjusted to reflect the full data parameters published by the CEC, the final election result placing Georgian Dream at 53.96% is, simply put, statistically impossible. ”
- HarrisX urges the CEC to provide further information and clarification to ensure public transparency.

Source: [HarrisX](#)

- “Edison’s review found that the deviation from statistically expected results was widespread but most pronounced at specific polling locations in rural areas.”
- “Edison also conducted 12 nationally representative surveys in Georgia in 2023-24. These polls suggested that Georgian Dream would under-perform their 2020 vote by around 10 points. Instead, Georgian Dream exceeded their 2020 numbers by 6 points.” **“The exit poll models used in Georgia in 2024 are the same models used in previous Georgian elections.** They are also the same models Edison Research will use in the upcoming U.S. election exit polls for ABC, CBS, CNN, and NBC.”
- **On average, there has been a 2% difference between exit polls conducted by Edison Research and the official results from the CEC over the years. However, on October 26 this difference increased to 12-13%.**
- „Edison’s Election Day process also includes quality checks of the data by polling location to remove or reweight any data that appears to have issues or errors that will make estimates less accurate – these include interference by an election official, interviewer error, bad weather, or evidence of fraud.”

Source: [Edison Research](#)



Post-Election Analysis by HarrisX

- Statistical variance across **27** districts (in the table below) has been tested at a 95% confidence interval, revealing that the **variance observed is highly improbable or impossible.**

- The average variance across the 27 identified districts is **15%**, or sum of at least **172,523** raw votes, amounting to over 8% of the total turnout of voters (2.06 million).

- According to HarrisX, **discrepancies are not limited to 27 districts.**

Region	District	GD Vote 2020 (ElectionsData.ge/data)	GD Vote 2024 (Election Administration of Georgia)	GD Vote 2024 (HarrisX)	VARIANCE: GD Vote 2024 (Election Administration of Georgia) vs. GD Vote 2024 (HarrisX)	GD Vote 2020 (ElectionsData.ge/data)	GD Vote 2024 (Election Administration of Georgia)	GD Vote 2024 (HarrisX Estimates)	VARIANCE: GD Vote 2024 (Election Administration of Georgia) vs. GD Vote 2024 (HarrisX)
Tbilisi	01.Mtatsminda	43%	42%	30%	+12%	13,003	14,699	10,586	+4,113
	02.Vake	41%	38%	28%	+10%	25,237	28,997	21,022	+7,975
	03.Saburtalo	41%	39%	27%	+13%	30,908	37,705	25,412	+12,293
	04.Krtsanisi	44%	49%	36%	+13%	9,086	11,002	8,073	+2,929
	05.Isani	42%	45%	33%	+12%	23,110	28,778	20,880	+7,898
	06.Samgori	42%	45%	34%	+11%	29,782	36,999	27,607	+9,391
	07.Chughureti	45%	44%	33%	+11%	14,188	17,941	13,519	+4,422
	08.Didube	44%	42%	30%	+12%	17,169	17,290	12,366	+4,924
Kakheti	10.Gldani	39%	41%	32%	+8%	27,876	34,993	27,785	+7,208
	11.Sagarejo	50%	66%	49%	+16%	11,442	16,313	12,244	+4,069
	12.Gurjaani	52%	62%	49%	+13%	16,935	20,094	15,806	+4,288
	13.Sighnaghi	53%	63%	37%	+25%	9,503	11,319	6,717	+4,602
	16.Kvareli	47%	57%	23%	+34%	8,459	9,851	3,966	+5,884
Kvenmo Kartli	18.Akhmeta	43%	56%	26%	+30%	7,017	8,778	4,087	+4,691
	22.Mardeuli	48%	80%	40%	+40%	21,451	34,328	17,263	+17,065
	23.Bolnisi	68%	81%	55%	+26%	18,173	20,788	14,158	+6,631
	28.Dusheti	53%	59%	44%	+15%	7,338	8,889	6,636	+2,253
Samegrelo - Zemo Svaneti	32.Gori	52%	57%	42%	+14%	32,945	37,474	27,966	+9,508
	35.Khashuri	46%	52%	38%	+14%	12,572	14,800	10,810	+3,990
	40.Akhalkalaki	65%	88%	59%	+29%	12,270	18,187	12,132	+6,055
Imereti	54.Samtredia	54%	62%	36%	+26%	13,651	15,432	8,987	+6,445
	58.Tskaltubo	44%	58%	45%	+13%	12,205	16,624	12,853	+3,771
	59.Kutaisi	41%	47%	35%	+12%	29,219	38,095	28,363	+9,733
Samegrelo - Zemo Svaneti	67.Zugdidi	47%	51%	42%	+9%	25,110	27,789	23,113	+4,676
	68.Tsalenjikha	47%	48%	24%	+24%	6,700	7,200	3,599	+3,601
	70.Poti	50%	52%	32%	+20%	10,909	11,290	7,011	+4,279
Adjara	79.Batumi	42%	50%	39%	+11%	32,305	45,593	35,762	+9,830
Total	Total	46%	51%	36%	+15%	478,563	591,247	418,724	+172,523

Source: [HarrisX](#)

Results of Pre-Election Polls


Pre-election surveys indicated that Georgian Dream's rating stood at ~ 40% of the votes

- In reliable polls, the best result for Georgian Dream was **40%** in the Rosner Research poll.
- On average, across six surveys, Georgian Dream received around **37%** of the votes.
- According to the statement by Edison Research (form November 1, 2024):

“Only Edison Research conducted 12 nationally representative surveys in Georgia between 2023 and 2024. These polls indicated that Georgian Dream would fall short of its 2020 results by about 10%. Contrary to expectations, Georgian Dream exceeded its 2020 results by 6%. **This abnormality in the results suggests widespread and systemic vote manipulation.**”

It should be noted, that Gorbi is a local company associated with Georgian Dream and considered and cannot be perceived as neutral and independent.

Public and Private Opinion Polls



Systemic and Repeated Nature of Violations

Summary


- Based on the **preliminary assessment of 1,479 claims and violation protocols** submitted by observers of political parties as well as independent observer organizations which are available on the CEC web page, **42 types of violations have been identified.**
- **Based on the analysis, election fraud was of a systemic, which had a substantial influence on the outcome of the elections:**
 - **Various types of election violations occurred at 72% of polling stations (2,250 out of 3,111)**
 - **85% of analyzed violations were of repeated nature**
 - **7 types of most severe violations occurred more in more than 10% of cases out of which 3 occurred in more than 20% of cases**
- **Absolute majority (ca 80%) of these claims were completed without any investigation or due process with many decisions simply stating that "the claim was not accepted".**

Systemic Nature of Election Violations

- Based on the **preliminary assessment of 1,479 claims and violation protocols** submitted by observers of political parties as well as independent observer organizations which are available on the CEC web page. Overall, **42 types of violations have been identified.**
- In total 2,429 violations were analyzed. These include violations which were recorded during the election day by observers in precincts throughout Georgia and were then advanced to district election commissions, the Central Election Commission (CEC), or the first and second-instance courts.
- The violations analyzed in detail covered 2,250 precincts, which means that **election violations were recorded in 72% of precincts** (i.e. 2,250 out of 3,110). **This clearly indicates systemic nature of violations.**
- Importantly, **85% of analyzed violations were of repeated or systemic nature** i.e. they occurred multiple times at the same precinct, occurred continuously during the whole day and/or occurred at two or more precincts. Only 15% of violations occurred one time.

Violations by type

One-time violations
15%



Repeated and
systemic violations
85%

Systemic Nature of Election Violations (cont.)

- **Substantial portion of violations are of systemic nature and there is statistical evidence of this:**

Violations related to the accuracy of final protocols	31.9% of claims
Violation of secrecy of votes	22.6% of claims
Improper handling of assigned tasks by the precinct election commission members	22.3% of claims
Violations related to ballots	16% of claims
Violations of inking rules	11.5% of claims
Violations related to “checks” printed from verification machines	11.2% of claims
Limiting the rights of observers	11.1% of claims

- **In addition, there are violations of significant nature** that are observed in single or multiple cases, but their nature indicates a high probability that they are systemic. e.g. voting machines accepted expired ID cards, which indicates flaws in the electronic voting process and deficiencies in voting lists loaded in the machines.
- The scale, coverage and nature of violations documented in the above-mentioned claims and violation protocols filed by observers **provides sufficient foundation for the initiation of independent investigation of election fraud.**
- **The need for an impartial, independent, international investigation is strengthened by the fact that it is virtually impossible to achieve an objective and impartial investigation of election fraud in Georgian courts, which are controlled by the ruling Georgian Dream party. Ultimately all claims were rejected by the courts.**


Summary

- According to expert evaluation, statistical extrapolation of voting distribution in Georgian 2024 parliamentary elections, based on the widely used model for assessing the degree of how free and fair elections are, **reveals deviations from normal voting patterns.**
- **Curves** reflecting distribution of votes **show different patterns** in rural and urban areas - in urban areas, distribution of voting results suggests relatively fair elections, while **in rural areas – not.**
- **In rural areas:**
 - The curve has an unusual 'tail' (the so-called Russian tail) - **hinting at fraud** and suggesting that **ballots were stuffed or miscounted.**
 - At hundreds of small and large locations, **100% of voters voted**, and **almost all voted for the Georgian Dream party** that is **almost unreal in fair elections.**
- According to ISFED, at a significant number of polling stations, **the differences in voter turnout between male and female voters deviate from a normal distribution, exhibiting practically impossible or unnatural characteristics.** At some polling stations **the number of male voters exceeded the number of registered male voters.** Such discrepancies are revealed at **electronic polling stations** too (Tbilisi (Samgori) and Samtredia), which raises reasonable suspicion of **hacking.**
- **Overall, in 2024 elections male participation was higher than female - 53% vs 37% - which is unusual. For example, in 2020 parliamentary elections voters were dominated by female (50.3% vs 49.7%*)**

Voting Patterns and Distribution

- This methodology is one of the most widely recognized statistical tools used internationally **to assess the degree of how free and fair elections were.**
- **Voting results should follow a bell curve**, or normal distribution, because of statistical principles that govern large, random samples.
- **A curve of this shape occurs because voters make independent choices** influenced by various personal factors, creating natural variability that centers around a mean preference. As a result, when these individual decisions aggregate across a large population, **they form a bell curve.**
- The **example of Poland** illustrates how fair election results follow a normal distribution.
- **Any deviation from this pattern needs explanation.**


Example of Poland



Voting Patterns and Distribution

- The example of Georgia displays 2 graphs comparing rural and urban areas.
- In urban areas, voting results are mostly around the average, suggesting relatively fair elections or as it can be concluded, based on other analyses, well organized and balanced across different precincts rigging took place in urban areas.
- In the rural areas there is an unusual 'tail', (so-called Russian tail), on the right, **hinting at fraud**
 - Hundreds of locations show unusually “high support” for the government
- It is virtually impossible for so many locations to naturally produce such a sharp spike, rather than a smooth trend.
- **This pattern suggests ballots were stuffed or miscounted.**


Example of Georgia



*PEC - Precinct Election Commission level. In this context, it means reporting the number of votes each candidate or party received at each individual precinct or polling station




Taking a Closer Look

- On the charts on the right, each dot represents a voting place:
 - Y: % of registered voters who supported the party
 - X: % of registered voters who voted (turnout)
 - Every blue dot has its mirrored red dot and **the sum of both dots' data points (government & opposition) should be 100%, represented by the $y=x$ black diagonal line**
 - Dots can't go above the black diagonal line because it is impossible to get more votes than voters who showed up
- In fair voting, the slope of the point cluster aligns with the candidate's percentage (*if a candidate has 30% support in the population, then out of every 100 voters, 30 support the candidate, or $y = 0.3 * x$*).
- That is why dots are expected to **cluster around their trend lines** and **this is exactly what is seen in urban areas**, indicating that the elections were relatively fair or, as it can be concluded based on other analyses, better organized and balanced across different precincts.
- In rural areas, the ruling party has numerous data points that **deviate significantly from the trend line, coming very close to the black diagonal line**.
 - This means that in hundreds of small and large locations, **100% of voters show up, and almost all 100 % of the vote for the ruling party—a scenario that is almost unreal in fair elections.**



'Comet' Pattern

- A 'comet' pattern can occur when analyzing election results where most votes cluster around one political party.
- Similar 'comet' patterns are observed in the Georgian electoral data.
- When Georgian electoral data is disaggregated into urban and rural areas, it can be observed that **rural areas almost fully account for the 'comet' pattern.**
- This case shows that **Georgian Dream artificially inflated their vote share in rural areas.**
- The figure on the right corner illustrates elections from various countries; the examples of Uganda and Russia show clusters extending into the upper-right region of the plots, reaching a secondary peak at 100% turnout and 100% of votes (indicated by red circles).



Widespread Anomalies in Voter Turnout

According to forensic and statistical analysis conducted by policy researcher Dr. Hans Gutbrod:


- A major feature of Georgian elections 2024 was **“vote buying on an unprecedented scale”**
- **“Intimidation** before and during the vote played a major role in the elections”

The analysis of voter turnout reveals **“widespread anomalies in voter turnout and party vote shares for the ruling Georgian Dream party”**.

According to the analysis, “in some areas, turnout increased greatly, such as in Tbilisi where support was mostly leaning to opposition parties, and in some more remote areas, where support was overwhelmingly for the Georgian Dream.”

“In large parts of Kakheti in eastern Georgia, where the main coordinator of the Georgian Dream was a feared former security official, turnout declined while support for the Georgian Dream went up, suggesting vote suppression against the opposition parties.”

GD vote share 2020 (x-axis) vs 2024 (y-axis)



“Statistical analyses, including matched comparisons, reveal a consistent pattern of irregularities in this election.”

The Differences in Turnout Between Male & Female Voters


According to the International Society for Fair Elections And Democracy (ISFED), **at a significant number of polling stations, the differences in voter turnout between male and female voters deviate from a normal distribution and exhibit characteristics that are practically impossible or unnatural.**

- At 23 polling stations, **the number of male voters exceeded the number of registered male voters. Importantly, such an anomaly was observed on electronic polling stations too,* which raises reasonable suspicion of hacking.**
- Notably, at least 6 of these stations reported male voter turnout exceeding 100%, even under the hypothetical assumption that all voters on the special voter list were male.
- At 275 polling stations, the **difference in voter turnout between male and female voters exceeded 20 percentage points.** Of these, 243 stations reported a higher turnout for male voters, while 32 showed a higher turnout for female voters.
- Among these 275 stations, **67 had male voter turnout surpassing female turnout by more than 30 percentage points.** Conversely, at 12 stations, female voter turnout exceeded male turnout by the same margin.


* In Tbilisi (Samgori district precinct (06.50)) and Samtredia (precinct (54.18))

It is worth noting that after ISFED requested detailed polling station data, the initial voter turnout data was removed from the CEC website and replaced with updated figures.

Compared to 2016 and 2020 parliamentary election results, in 2024 elections the difference between male and female turnout is abnormal



Source: [ISFED](#)



*Source: [CEC](#)

** Source: [IRI report](#)


Unexplained statistical variance identified by HarrysX in the post-election audit broadly coincides with the difference in discrepancy between male and female turnout in 2024 and previous elections (demonstrated on the graph above). The above-mentioned raises doubts about carousel method of voting.

Stolen Votes

How many votes were stolen in the Georgian Elections?

According to the analysis of Roman Udot - independent election observer, data analyst, co-chair of “Golos 2013-2023” and former political prisoner in Russia – **the scale of distortion in 2024 elections is 300,000 votes** in favor of Georgian Dream (GD).

- There was a **gender deviation** discovered in the voters data that correlated with the results of the Georgian Dream party.
- Under the assumption of restored election results (excluding fraud), based on a specific methodology, **the scale of distortion is 300,000 votes** in favor of GD.
- “The restored result of GD is:
 - 45% after eliminating fraud, and
 - 38% when the stolen votes are returned to the affected parties.”



Source: [X.com](#); [tableau public](#)

Summary

- **2024 parliamentary elections have not been qualified as “free and fair” by any of the independent international or local observation missions.**
- Observations identified a **substantial number of issues**, including in **pre-election period as well as on the election day**, having a **negative impact** on the election process as a whole, as well as on **election results**.
- **Frequent violations of a systemic nature** have been detected, such as **violation of vote secrecy** and **restriction of free voting**, which are guaranteed by the **Constitution of Georgia**.
- **The grounds for violation**, such as the so-called **carousel voting**, which had a **substantial influence on the election results**, were prepared and organized in the **pre-election period**, among others via **confiscation of ID cards and ID numbers for their improper use**.

Preliminary findings of the International Election Observation Mission (which included representatives from NATO Parliamentary Assembly, European Parliament, OSCE/ODIHR, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe) **does not confirm that elections** on October 26, 2024 **in Georgia were free and fair.**

According to the preliminary findings and conclusions of International Election Observation Mission, among others, the following issues related to the 2024 parliamentary elections were identified/observed:

- The elections „unfolded amid **entrenched polarization.**“
- **A negative impact** of recently adopted legislation „on **fundamental freedoms and civil society**“.
- „**Pressure on voters, particularly on public sector employees, remained widespread in the campaign.** This, coupled with extensive tracking of voters on election day, raised concerns about the ability of some voters to cast their vote without fear of retribution.”
- “Recent frequent amendments *[of legal framework]* marked a **step backwards, raising concerns over its potential use for political gain.**”
- “Effectiveness of campaign **finance oversight was undermined by limited enforcement,** and concerns over the impartiality and political instrumentalization of the oversight body.”
- **Election day “was** marked by a **tense environment,** with **frequent compromises in vote secrecy** and several procedural inconsistencies, as well as reports of **intimidation and pressure on voters** that negatively impacted public trust in the process.”
- “Key stakeholders were not provided access to the audit *[of electronic devices]* processes and had limited access to related documentation, limiting transparency, at odds with international good practice”
- Findings indicate that “In 24 per cent of observations, vote secrecy was potentially compromised by the manner of inserting the ballots by the voters into ballot boxes, or the layout or setup of polling stations in 7 per cent.”
- “In most polling stations, party representatives, **mostly from GD, recorded the voting process.** This, as observed, **had an intimidating effect, as the cameras were often directed at VIDs or polling booths, potentially compromising the secrecy of the vote.**”
- “**Unknown individuals were also seen tracking voters outside** (10 per cent) and **party representatives inside polling stations** (7 per cent). IEOM observers reported **group or family voting** in 4 per cent of the polling stations.”
- “In some instances, IEOM observers received allegations **of vote buying.**”

- My Vote, a coalition observation mission of Georgian civil organizations, monitored the October 26 parliamentary elections nationwide, with nearly **2,000 observers**, who continuously monitored 1,131 polling stations opened throughout the country and 150 polling stations abroad.
- My Vote provides clear evidence of election rigging in Georgia, as reported by local media, including over **220 files of photos and video recordings that document violations witnessed on election day.**
- The election observer coalition My Vote filed complaints in **29** election districts, **seeking the annulment of the results of 246 election precincts.** **The total number of registered voters at these election precincts is 417,305.**
- On the election day, the observers from the coalition My Vote detected violations of the secrecy of voting, voting instead of someone else/voting repeatedly, not checking the markings and voting without marking, physical and verbal attacks on the polling station, hundreds of facts of hindering and making the observation impossible (especially the observation of the verification process), presence of unauthorized aggressive persons in the area and agitation by the members of the commission.

Violations of election process identified by My Vote (as of November 7, 2024)

Types of violation	Number of precincts
The observer was hindered from observing	160
Inking was not checked	191
Inking was not applied	153
Secrecy of voting was violated	365
Physical confrontation /violence/ pressure was recorded	85
Unauthorized persons were present at the precinct or near the precinct	259

In 196 precincts (i.e. 17% of the precincts under the observation of My Vote) the violations took place in a repeated, continuous, and in some cases systemic manner.

Transparency International

The role of the Central Election Commission in the election-rigging scheme

As reported by Transparency International, obtained and publicly available evidences demonstrate the involvement of the **Central Election Commission (CEC) in the election-rigging scheme**. More specifically:

- **Violation of vote secrecy:** “The CEC did not fulfill its **promise** that the quality of the ballot paper would ensure voter confidentiality on election day.” Thin paper of ballots allowed **individuals** present at electronic voting stations as well as **video cameras** installed near voting booths **to identify the choices made by voters**.
- **Influence on registrars and individuals to comply with Georgian Dream interest:** On the basis of arbitrary amendments without arguments to the electoral legislation by the CEC, before the elections (without consultation and involvement of interested parties), the CEC: **determined the roles of registrars one week before** the elections (by lottery) instead of doing this on election day; **appointed individuals working with verification devices a week in advance**. This allowed the CEC to influence registrars and individuals to comply with Georgian Dream interests.
- **Infringement of queue management and marking procedure rules:** The same decision by the CEC “led to the non-transparent assignment of roles responsible for queue management and marking procedures to precinct election commission members.” Violation of inking rules “significantly contributed to the success of the fraud scheme,” and “the **failure to mark voters** made it **possible for individuals to vote using someone else's identification card and personal number**”.
- **Carousel voting:** “Implementation of such a large-scale scheme - voting with someone else’s IDs [for example on behalf of those who were not present in Georgia or at their registered address] would have been impossible without the involvement of the electoral administration.” “CEC's decision not to open additional polling stations abroad increased the number of citizens who could not participate in the elections.”

- **Restriction of voting rights:**
 - Certain voters were not allowed to vote because they were supposedly listed for mobile ballot boxes and their votes had already been cast. individuals visited their homes on behalf of the election administration, promising to include them in the mobile ballot box list and deliver the mobile ballot box to their homes on election day. However, the mobile ballot box was not brought to them. Most likely, other persons voted instead.
 - At several polling stations abroad, in cities with large emigrant voter populations, the voting process was hindered by inadequate infrastructure and a shortage of registrars - many voters were unable to vote.
- **Obstacles to observation:** Despite its **commitment not to create obstacles to observation of the verification process**, the observation in many **precincts was impossible** - registration tables were positioned against walls in a way that prevented observers from fully monitoring the process; in cases when observers were allowed to stand behind verification devices, commission members instructed them to move away, stating that they did not have the right to observe from that location. In certain cases, observers were deliberately expelled from polling stations.
- **Appointment of family members and affiliates of Georgian Dream as precinct election commission members and chairpersons:** Commission members obstructed observation efforts by monitoring organizations, acted aggressively, verbally and physically insulted observers, and reacted irritably to written complaints. They facilitated the presence of unauthorized individuals at precincts, recorded and monitored voters, and relayed voter information to the ruling party's so-called "call centers."
- **Non-response on violations:** Despite numerous reporting on violations during the election day (voting using someone else's IDs, verification process failures, marking procedure violations etc.), the CEC chairman did not respond to them and did not instruct commission members/relevant services to react.
- **CEC granted accreditation to Russian propagandist sought by U.S.:** Media reports indicate that the CEC accredited Russian propaganda outlets, including Aleksandr Malkevich, a Russian propagandist associated with NTV, who has previously violated Georgia's 'Law on Occupied Territories.' Malkevich is wanted by U.S. authorities for alleged interference in U.S. elections, with a \$10 million reward for his capture. The responsibility for his accreditation lies with the secretary of the commission

Georgian Young Lawyers' Association (GYLA)

- According to GYLA, „the voting day of the 26 October 2024 parliamentary elections took place in an environment marked by **significant violations**, predominantly characterized by inequality, violence, and tension.“
Source: GYLA; [27.10.2024](#)
- On election day, GYLA recorded **589** violations/bad practices.
- Given the nature, intensity, and interrelation of these violations, GYLA's observation mission identifies the main violations as follows:
 - **Failure to adhere to basic voting procedures** – various forms of violations related to inking procedures were noted.
 - **Prevention observers in conducting their activities** – throughout the day, observers faced numerous obstacles that impeded their ability to ensure a free and transparent observation process.
 - **Violation of ballot secrecy and influence on voter will.**
- On October 29, GYLA submitted complaints to district election commissions, requesting the **annulment of results from all polling stations (2,263 stations)** within the respective districts **where elections were conducted using Smartmatic electronic voting machines. This represents 75% of the total 3,111 precincts and covers some 90% of the electorate*.**
- The reason behind the complaint is violation of ballot secrecy, as the paper used for machine voting was very thin and the marking showing the voter's choice could be well identified by observers – who were purposefully located near electronic voting machines.
Source: GYLA; [27.10.2024](#), [30.10.2024](#)

The judge Vladimir Khuchua of Tetrtskaro District Court satisfied the claim of GYLA on the massive breach of vote secrecy and annuled the results of 30 precincts with approximately 20,000 voters, while Tbilisi and Kutaisi courts of appeals rejected the same claim filled by GYLA.

Key Methods Used in Election Fraud

Summary

- According to the monitoring results and documented evidence, **numerous methods and violation schemes were used during the election process. The nature and scale of violations is such, that it had a substantial influence on the election results.**
- Violations related to the election process started **in the pre-election period** (changes in electoral legislation, confiscation of ID cards, collection of personal information of voters etc.), **which created grounds for election fraud.**
- **Among the main schemes of fraud are violation of vote secrecy and inking rules, carousel voting, bribing and Intimidation of voters, multiple voting, creation of obstacles for observation, creation of obstacles in the voting process at polling stations and outside, possible hacking etc.**
- **Violation of vote secrecy, which was the most widespread and severe violation**, was a particularly sensitive matter in Georgian elections marred with mass intimidation of voters by the ruling GD party and threats to those who would not vote for the GD. Voters were afraid of making free choice as this could result in dismissals and withdrawal of social and other benefits.
- **There is a large amount of photo and video material on falsification of elections, as well as post-election journalistic investigations that prove the systemic nature of violations and election fraud.**

The Principle of Vote Secrecy Was Violated

- Voters, election watchdogs, and opposition parties have raised alarms about a **widespread breach of secrecy** in the 2024 general elections, arguing that **the new electronic voting system made voters' choices visible to others**.
- According to the GYLA, they sent a letter to the Central Election Commission (CEC) on September 17, in which they addressed several issues, including the quality of the ballot and **emphasized the need for measures to ensure that voter secrecy was not violated**. On September 28 the GYLA was informed that the ballot used during the training and informational meetings held by the CEC was a test version, and that **the quality of the ballot used on voting day would differ to ensure confidentiality. However, this condition was not met**.
- In addition to ballot quality, **suspicious** regarding **an organized violation** of vote secrecy are also **raised by the fact that the voting markers** used in the voting trainings and elections were different. In accordance with the procurement agreement between the CEC and Smartmatic, markers were to be manufactured and supplied by Smartmatic. Markers used in the election trainings were branded, while there is no proof available that markers used on the election day were produced by Smartmatic as they had a different shape and were not branded. A combination of improper paper and suspicious marker raises serious doubts whether there was a purposeful effort of violation of vote secrecy.
- **According to the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters** (Venice Commission), technical irregularities, such as for example “inadequate ballot papers”, “in addition to political party electioneering inside the polling station and police harassment, can seriously vitiate the voting process, or indeed undermine its integrity and validity”.
- Preliminary conclusions made by the **OSCE/ODIHR indicate that vote secrecy was potentially compromised in 24% of observations**, due to the manner of ballot insertion into VCDs or inadequate polling station layouts.


*Source: [Venice Commission](#)

**Source: [OSCE/ODIHR](#)

Trace of ink is also discernible on the back side of President's ballot paper



Markers used in the training



Markers used in the elections



Source: [CEC](#)

Problems With Finger-Inking

- **The following violations were observed regarding finger-inking:**

- 1) The registrar did not apply ink to voters' fingers
- 2) The registrar asked voters whether they wanted ink applied
- 3) Voters were admitted to polling stations without checking if their fingers had been inked



- **How was this achieved?**

- 1) One week prior to the elections, the **administration rules were altered**, and instead of employing independent registrars, they **appointed supporters of GD to oversee the inking process, ID checking process and registration process – all conducted by one - “main” registrar**
- 2) There was **no video control** at the polling stations, and it was impossible to control this process.

- **The above-described led to carousel voting.**

Carousel Voting: Confiscation and Misuse of ID Cards for Voting

▪ Confiscation of ID cards belonging to individuals supporting opposition parties

- The ID cards were confiscated from **people who support the opposition** and mostly who are **employed in the public service**. This process was carried out through either **bribery or threats**, such as the threat of dismissal.
- These ID cards were given to supporters of Georgian Dream (GD) party, who voted instead of the rightful ID card holders with the help of the “main” registrars.

▪ Confiscation of ID cards belonging to individuals supporting GD

- The ID cards were confiscated from **individuals who supported the GD but the ruling party was uncertain about their participation** in the elections. The IDs were returned back to the owners just before the election day, but the ID numbers were recorded to be used on election day (“recorded IDs”). These GD supporters were given an instruction to vote before 13:00 on the election day.
- On the election day, toward the end of the voting process, supporters of GD were provided with the numbers of the ID cards belonging to those who did not attend the polls, and they voted on behalf of those individuals with the help of “main” registrars. The fake voters showed up with their own passports having the “recorded IDs” written on a paper and hidden in the passport, when “main” registrar inputted the “recorded ID” number of not showed up voter into the system instead of the passport number of the individual standing to vote (the electronic registering machines had a fault – not recognizing passports, only recognizing ID cards, and passport numbers should have been inputted by hand).

Carousel Voting: Improper Use of ID numbers of Emigrants


▪ Improper use of emigrant ID numbers

- As of the October 26 elections, **95,910 Georgian emigrants were registered to vote**. The data from the Central Election Commission (CEC) indicates that the total number of Georgian citizens living abroad is 276,040. **However, the actual number of Georgian emigrants is higher:**
 - The CEC voter list includes 3,495,789 individuals, while the National Statistics Office of Georgia reports that, as of January 1, 2024, there were 2,852,881 Georgian citizens of voting age in Georgia. Hence, **the true number of Georgian emigrants is 642,908** ($3,495,789 - 2,852,881$).
 - Therefore, **546,998 Georgian emigrants** ($642,908 - 95,910$) **were not registered to vote. Consequently, ID numbers of these individuals were "available for use"** on the election day, according to the same election rigging methods described earlier.
- The fact that on the day of the election the Government of Georgia asked the operating airlines for the lists of people arriving to Georgia on that day strengthens the above-described doubts.

Lack of Precincts/Registrars for Voters Abroad

- According to the Georgia's Central Election Commission, the number of voters residing abroad and eligible for participation in the October 26 parliamentary elections constituted 95,834, based on the latest information provided by the country's Foreign Affairs Ministry and other relevant agencies. 67 election precincts, mostly at embassies and consulates, in 42 countries were established to serve the registered voters abroad.
- **According to official statistics, last year alone, more than 125,000 people left the country. Many more leave the country unofficially.**
- According to the law, a minimum of 50 voters must be registered for a precinct to open, while the maximum limit is set at 3,000. In more than 50 cities worldwide Georgian citizens, following all the rules and regulations (providing signatures of at least 50 voters) officially requested from the CEC to open new precincts.
- However, the **CEC did not accommodate these requests**. Furthermore, **the court declined to consider the appeals from emigrants and their legal representatives** in this regard.
- In case of the original 67 precincts opened abroad, especially in Europe and the USA, voters stood in queues for many hours. The situation was alarming at many locations, where the commission was unable to register voters due to high turnout and voters were unable to vote. **One of the main problems was the lack of registrars at several locations abroad.**
- **In some cases 3-4 precincts were open at one address (as registered voters were more than 3,000) and in relatively small spaces in order to artificially create long queues and prevent voters from voting.**
- **Tens of thousands** of voters showed up to vote and **were not able to do so** due to long lines and slow process of queue management, which was purposefully arranged in such a manner, in order to prevent voters from casting their ballot - **this was an intentional voter suppression method.**

As the results from polling stations outside Georgia demonstrate, opposition has strong support among Georgian emigrants



- **Four opposition parties gathered almost 77% vs GD 13.4%.**
- GD has limited election fraud capabilities outside Georgia.

Electronic Voting Machines with Adjusted Functions

- **Electronic Voting Machines with Adjusted Functions Serving Election Fraud Purposes**
 - The electronic identification machines used for the elections **feature both facial recognition and fingerprint recognition functions** (the latter used in Venezuelan elections). However, the **Georgian government has not installed these functions** in the machines that were used during the elections.
 - It was possible to **connect a flash drive to the ballot receiving device**, which could easily be used to hack the device during the election day and/or customize it from distance.
 - It is very likely that the producer of the machines, **Smartmatic, was well aware of the potential fraud mechanisms** taking into account the specifications that were requested by the CEC when ordering the electronic voting machines.
 - **The GD has rented offices – the so-called “call centers” within 50 meters from polling stations (more than a dozen such call centers have already been identified)**, which monitored voter activity and violated their freedom of choice and/or were used to hack the electronic voting machines.
 - Electronic voting has faced significant challenges in the Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, and the Philippines due to hacking incidents and security concerns.
- Source: [Bloomberg](#)
- **As it was indicated in the OSCE-ODHIR preliminary findings, “key stakeholders were not provided access to the audit [of electronic devices] processes and had limited access to related documentation, limiting transparency, at odds with international good practice”.**

Issues with Electronic Voting Machines

- The US company, Smartmatic, supplier of voting machines for Georgian 2024 elections, has **been involved in a number of scandals, for example the one related to** elections in the Philippines:
 - Recently, the U.S. Justice Department charged some current and former executives of Smartmatic for paying bribes to win election contracts in the Philippines.
- The international audit of the electronic voting technologies was conducted by the US company Pro V&V.
- As reported, **no representatives of opposition parties, NGOs or experts were involved** in this process; during the audit, the issues related to **fingerprints, face recognition and USB port** were not evaluated at all, as far as these aspects had not been part of the respective contract between Smartmatic and the CEC.
- According to the Pro V&V, audit report, **requirements related to universal, equal and free suffrage as well as secrecy of suffrage are successfully met** and “no issues or deficiencies noted”; Also, regulatory and organizational requirements and requirement related to transparency and observations are successfully met and “no issues or deficiencies noted”. However, as it has been revealed, there are serious problems in all these areas.

Source: [Zero Day](#)

Source: [Pro V&V audit report](#)

Taking into account the above-mentioned facts, there is sufficient grounds to launch an investigation into possible corruption schemes involving the Georgian CEC and Smartmatic, based on the Foreign Corruption Practice Act, in order to determine whether this U.S. company was in any way involved in corrupt practice related to election manipulations in Georgia’s 2024 parliamentary elections.

Russian Interference in the Elections

- In the **Bloomberg article** "*How Russia's Spies Hacked the Entire Nation of Georgia*", it was reported that **Russian spies have monitored Georgian government structures and major companies for years**, gathering data for potential sabotage of critical infrastructure. The hacking campaign, which occurred from 2017 to 2020, targeted various key entities, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the National Bank, and significant energy and telecommunications providers. Additionally, documents obtained by Bloomberg and European officials revealed that **hackers compromised the emails of Georgia's Central Election Commission**, allegedly gaining partial access to the system.
Source: [Bloomberg](#)
- **"Russian intelligence plans to interfere in the Georgian elections on Saturday and then use Georgia's pro-Russian ruling party to return the country to the Kremlin's influence"** – sad Christo Grozev, investigative journalist of Bellingcat in its interview with Lithuanian news outlet Delfi, before October, 26.
Source: [Delfi](#)
- St. Petersburg media manager and **the founder of a Russian propaganda network** in the occupied Ukrainian territories **Alexander Malkevich** was in Tbilisi for several days during the **elections**. Moreover, he was granted an **accreditation by Central Election Commission (CEC)** for election coverage. Notably, **Malkevich has been sanctioned by several countries**, including the USA and Ukraine, for meddling in US elections, illegal activities and much of Russian propaganda in occupied Ukraine; he was a close associate of the notorious Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin. **The CEC stated that he accreditation was issued in compliance with the election legislation and in general, the CEC does not have an access to legal statuses of persons.**
Source: [Reporters Without Borders](#); media outlet [Civil.ge](#) and [Radio Tavisupleba](#).
- According to TASS (Russian media outlet), before the elections, on October 3, **the Director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Sergey Naryshkin**, expressed confidence that **Georgian citizens would make "the right choice"** in the October 26 parliamentary elections despite **"Western attempts" to "interfere" in the country's internal affairs**. Notably, there was no response to Naryshkin's statement from the Georgian authorities.
Source: [TASS](#)

Summary

- In total about **4,500** claims were filed to precinct election commissions, out of which **1,479 were advanced** to district election commissions, the CEC, or the first and second-instance courts.
- **Only 5% of claims have been fully satisfied** at the CEC level, but these claims concern issues of comparatively minor importance and **have no impact on the election results.**
- **Ultimately all court appeals were rejected by Georgian courts.**
- **However, there have been two precedents of impartial resolution of claims by two first instance courts:**
 - **Tetrtskaro District Court satisfied the claim** related to violation of vote secrecy in favor of claimant. Thus, the court confirmed that the vote secrecy was violated and annulled the results of 30 precincts with approximately 20,000 voters, based on the results of conducted voting tests during court proceedings.
 - **Gori District Court** partially satisfied the claim ordering the Gori district election commission to recount the number of invalid ballots in 15 precincts, but the second part of the claim related to imposition of disciplinary sanctions for the chairpersons and counters of precincts was not satisfied.
- **Despite the above-described results, all second instance courts rejected** all claims, including the above described cases.

Limited Precedents of Impartial Resolution Indicate Systemic Fraud

On November 4, 2024 two district courts upheld the lawsuits filed regarding election violations in favor of the plaintiffs – GYLA and ISFED. GYLA's Complaint was fully satisfied and ISFED's - partially.

Before this, not a single complaint had been satisfied by either local election commissions or the courts, including Tbilisi City Court.

1. Violation of vote secrecy (lawsuit by the Georgian Young Lawyers Association)

The judge **Vladimir Khuchua** of **Tetrtskaro District Court** confirmed that the vote secrecy was violated on October 26 elections. The claim was submitted by the Georgian Young Lawyers association (GYLA). **This was the first and important precedent for this case.**

The court checked the ballots of several precincts in Tsalka and Tetrtskaro districts with a random selection. It was confirmed that traces of a marker are visible on the back of the ballots, which violates the right to vote secrecy. The judge, who himself conducted the verification process during court proceedings, noted the obvious fact of violation of secrecy when placing the ballot in the vote counting machine. **This decision annuls the results of 30 precincts with approximately 20,000 voters.**

Since the fact of the violation of vote secrecy has already been confirmed in 30 precincts at the level of first instance courts, it indicates that violation of vote secrecy was of a systemic nature as the same paper and ink were used across all polling stations where voting was done electronically.

2. Recount of invalid ballots (lawsuit by the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy)

The judge Nino Gergauli at the Gori district court satisfied the claim of ISFED regarding the recounting of invalid ballots in 15 precincts. The court ordered the Gori district election commission to recount the number of invalid ballots in 15 precincts.

The claim of ISFED was partially satisfied, while the second part of ISFED's claim related to imposition of disciplinary sanctions for the chairpersons and counters of precincts due to violation of election rules, was not satisfied.

Ultimately the appellate court rejected all appeals related to violation of vote secrecy.



Judgments on Election Fraud Cases by Courts of Appeal

As of November 7, 2024, two decisions by Tbilisi and Kutaisi courts of appeals were issued - **both courts rejected claims on violation of vote secrecy.**

Tbilisi Court of Appeals

- Tbilisi Court of Appeals **rejected the claim on the massive breach of vote secrecy** after nearly 24 hours of discussion. The claim was filed by the GYLA requesting that the voting results in 1,293 districts in eastern Georgia, where voting was conducted using electronic machines, be annulled.
- The Judge Mikheil Gvritishvili (a member of the Judicial Panel), who is also referred to as a member of the “**clan of judges**”, requested to conduct a voting experiment in order to identify whether the secrecy of the vote had been violated. First, a representative of Central Election Commission conducted a demonstration of voting but placed the ballot in the voting machine in such a way that it was impossible to determine whether there had been a violation. After that, Judge Gvritishvili himself took part in the voting experiment - **the marked choice was visible through the paper of the ballot, which proves that the secrecy of the vote had been violated.**
- **Although there are video recordings of the entire process, which have also been broadcast on television and are available through various social media,** the court rejected the claim **on the grounds that it took into account the result of an experiment made by a representative of the CEC,** during which it was not possible to identify whether the secrecy of the electoral voice was violated or not.

Kutaisi Court of Appeals

- **Kutaisi Court of Appeal rejected the claim on violation of vote secrecy during the elections,** filed by observers of My Vote (coalition of NGOs) and Georgian Young Lawyers' Association (GYLA). Claimants requested the annulment of all results of the voting in all districts of Western Georgia, where voting was held through electronic machines.
- The representative of Transparency International-Georgia **requested recusal of the Judge Shota Siradze** (a member of the Judicial Panel) from the trial, as well as at the session the day before the trial, on the grounds of suspicion related to impartiality since he had been a member of the Khobi Sakrebulo from the GD and is also **the father of the head of the Patrol Police** of the Ministry of Interior, Vazha Siradze. **However, as a result of the discussions by other members of the panel, this request was declined.**

Changes in the Procedure for Staffing the Central Election Commission

Changes in the procedure for staffing the Central Election Commission(CEC) by the Parliament were made in order to facilitate rigging of electoral votes.

- CEC consists of no more than 17 members (including the chairman).
- Seven members and the chairman are elected by the Parliament, while other nine members are appointed by the political parties.
- In the spring of 2024, the **Parliament made amendments to the legislation, which changed the procedure for staffing the CEC.**
- In particular, on February 20, 2024, an amendment was made to Article 211¹ of the operating rules of the Parliament of Georgia, **which gave the ruling party the possibility to elect the CEC chairman and 7 members by a majority of 76 votes in the event of failure to reach the required 3/5 majority.**
- The Parliament elected Giorgi Kalandarishvili as the chairman of the CEC with 85 votes, which is less than required 3/5. He will hold the position for five years.

Summary

- All branches of power, legislative, executive and court, also, National Bank and Central Election Commission, were involved in election rigging during the whole election period.
 - **Parliament** - through adoption of legislative changes to electoral legislation, enabling election fraud.
 - **Government** (central and local) - through sharing different types of personal information to the ruling party that enabled carousel voting and intimidation of voters; using school and kindergarten personnel for propaganda and carousel voting as well as use of primacies for call centers; providing IT, logistical, and enforcement support; forcing citizens to vote in favor of the ruling party via various methods.
 - **Court** – through adopting biased and unsubstantiated decisions to protect ruling party interests.
 - **Central Election Commission (CEC)** – through involving GD observes in manipulation, procuring electronic voting equipment with improper functions, enabling manipulation.
 - **National Bank** - through selling reserves to artificially stabilize the Lari exchange rate.

Election Rigging - a Coordinated Effort by All Branches of Power

Parliament

Adopted legislative amendments to enable election fraud

National Bank of Georgia

Monetary reserves were sold to artificially stabilize the Lari exchange rate. The NBG sold record high amount of foreign reserves in October 2024 - 630 mln USD – higher than in any single month in the history of Georgia, surpassing the levels of sold reserves during the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of 2008.

CEC

- **Voting equipment was procured without fingerprint or biometric identification functions, retaining the outdated spray marking method for voter verification.**
- **Additionally, Georgian Dream observers were assigned to polling stations to oversee and manipulate voter identification and verification process. This was made possible through the adoption of a resolution, according to which the distribution of functions among the members of an election commission at the polling station was held 7 days before the election date, rather than the same date procedure.**

Central Government

- **Ministry of Justice:** utilized registration databases to share ID numbers required for election carousel operations with the ruling party aimed at manipulating the vote.
- **Ministry of Internally Displaced persons from the Occupied Territories, Health and Social Affairs:** provided data on socially vulnerable individuals to the State Security Service to identify and influence voters. The Ministry played a key role in targeting the most vulnerable members of the society, reportedly threatening them to withdraw social assistance in case they voted for opposition parties.
- **Ministry of Education:** directed school and kindergarten administrators and teachers to participate in election carousel schemes and leveraged their positions for propaganda purposes. In addition, GD election call centers were open in school premises.
- **Ministry of Internal Affairs (including the State Security Service and Patrol Police Department):** provided IT, logistical, and enforcement support to benefit the ruling party, using call centers as part of these operations.

Court

Courts have made unsubstantiated decisions regarding election fraud that are characterized by a high degree of bias and aimed at protecting the interests of the ruling party.

Local Government

Forced citizens to vote in favor of the ruling party using bribery and intimidation techniques, proofs of which are available.

10 Video Evidence of Election Fraud and Whistleblowing

Summary

- A recent journalistic investigation has uncovered significant electoral fraud and manipulation in Georgia's October 2024 parliamentary elections. The investigation revealed several concerning practices, including fraudulent voting in empty villages, voter intimidation, vote-buying, and misuse of government resources. Instances of nonexistent residents allegedly voting for the ruling party and passports being seized from locals further demonstrated how election results may have been influenced, particularly in two cities, Ninotsminda and Akhalkalaki.
- Nathalie Loiseau, Member of the European Parliament, voiced serious concerns about the election integrity, citing extensive evidence of voter intimidation, administrative abuse, and violence against opposition supporters, especially in Marneuli.
- A video compilation published by "Coalition 4 Change" documents various election-day violations across Georgia, including breaches of vote secrecy, inking system failures, carousel voting, double-voting, and cases of invalid ballots counted in favor of GD.

This evidence collectively raises doubts about the fairness and transparency of the election process.

Nodar Meladze's Saturday (TV show)

Part 1

This part of the journalistic investigation reveals election fraud in empty villages, where nonexistent residents allegedly voted for GD, passports were seized by the local governor, and votes were bought. These are the violations that influenced the election results in the municipalities of Ninotsminda and Akhalkalaki, where GD received 88% and 87% of the votes, respectively.

- This investigation reveals empty villages with no residents, yet, somehow, a local population (which in reality doesn't exist) appeared for the elections, with an absolute majority voting for GD.
- The journalist met a shepherd who says that registered voters moved to Armenia long ago, yet a few were bused in on election day to vote on behalf of others. Citizens arrived from Yerevan, likely persuaded or intimidated, as it's unclear why they'd travel such a long distance otherwise.
- The journalist uncovered that some residents who didn't vote had their passports taken by the local governor, likely contributing to GD's high vote count in abandoned villages.
- Verified reports also indicate that people received payments of 100, 150, or 200 GEL for their votes. Even in this case, securing over 100 and more votes in these empty villages seems implausible.
- It appears that voters registered in the villages but absent on election day shared their ID numbers and passports for election use with those still living there.

To view respective video material, please, click here: [TV Pirveli](#)

Part 2

This part of the journalistic investigation uncovers significant election violations involving intimidation by criminal groups linked to the government.

- Many supposed "observers" were criminals linked to the government: these GD-affiliated gang members intimidated voters around and inside polling stations, wearing organisation badges.
- On the election day, GD mobilized groups of street thugs to guard precinct entrances, preventing suspected opposition voters from entering and exercising their constitutional rights.
- At least one member in each GD squad had observer status, granting him/her access to polling stations to influence the voting process.
- Video evidence reveals that these "observers" frequently pressured voters and even entered voting booths, while government-hired provocateurs and public servants with observer accreditations roamed precincts.
- Reports and video footage suggest that these provocateurs intentionally created chaos inside polling stations, allowing officials to enable multiple votes with different IDs.

To view respective video material, please, click here: [TV Pirveli](#)

MEP Concerns & Coalition 4 Change's video compilation

Nathalie Loiseau (MEP) raised serious concerns about the fairness and integrity of Georgia's October 2024 parliamentary elections, citing evidence of voter intimidation, administrative misuse, and violence.

- Observers reported multiple acts of violence and intimidation, especially from GD affiliates, particularly in Marneuli, Capital city of Tbilisi, and the Kakheti region.
- Public sector employees were pressured to vote for GD, and government resources were misused to influence the election.
- There were concerns about voter privacy, with GD representatives installing cameras at polling stations.
- The tense atmosphere and organized transportation of voters further undermined the integrity of the election process.

To view respective video material, please, click here [georgiaelections2024](#)

The video published by “Coalition 4 Change” is a compilation of election-day violations observed across various districts and precincts throughout Georgia.

The video shows multiple cases of:

- Vote secrecy breach
- Inking system violations
- Carousel voting and double-voting
- Cases where invalid ballots were counted in favor of the GD

To view respective video material, please, click here: [Coalition 4 Change](#)

Whistleblower Confession

An interview with a man who took part in the October 26 election carousels, featured on the TV program Post Factum

- The TV program Post Factum aired an interview with an individual – Gocha Chalauri, who claimed **to have voted in approximately 30 polling stations and directly participated in the 'carousel voting' scheme.**
- Gocha Chalauri was **offered participation in an election fraud scheme by the deputy mayor of Gori**, with the promise of certain **material benefits**. Part of this assistance, which Chalauri was already entitled to as a socially disadvantaged individual with serious health problems, would be provided from the municipal budget. However, this promise was never fulfilled. Chalauri states that some of the people involved with him were also promised jobs, while others were offered financial assistance.
- According to this scheme, on October 26, Chalauri, along with three other individuals, traveled to various villages in the Gori municipality. The respondent states that upon arriving at the polling station, they were met by a car whose details they knew in advance. The person in the car gave them a small piece of paper with the name, surname, and ID number of the persons instead of whom he was instructed to vote. They would put this paper in their passport and enter the polling station.
- As Chalauri said, they were allowed into the precincts and could vote at multiple precincts without any problem.
- Regarding the **finger-inking**, Chalauri states that it was inconsistent—sometimes his finger was inked, and sometimes it wasn't. At times, the registrar would pretend to apply the ink, pouring the liquid onto a napkin instead. On other occasions, **they used water instead of the special ink or skipped the process entirely.**
- According to Gocha Chalauri, this scheme was used **to visit around 30 villages in Gori Municipality**. He claims that these cars were assigned to specific villages and settlements. Chalauri believes that on October 26, **a total of 120-130 cars were operating under this scheme in the Gori Municipality alone.**
- **After this interview, Gocha Chalauri left Georgia, believing that he was in danger following the public disclosure of this story.**

Summary

It is necessary to conduct international and impartial investigation on election fraud.

Such Investigation can be launched by the:

- **European Union: To determine whether the election process was “free and fair”** as ensuring free and fair elections is one of the main preconditions for Georgia’s further EU integration process as a candidate country.
- **U.S.: Investigation of the US company Smartmatic** on the basis of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act considering numerous proofs of voting violations in Georgia.
- **Joint US-EU investigation mechanism:** To make decision regarding suspension or restoration of donor and IFI’s assistance for Georgia.
- **Joint US-EU investigation mechanism:** To investigate Russian interference in Georgian elections aimed at election fraud and increase of Russian influence.

International Investigation Into Georgia's 2024 elections

International investigation of the elections could be launched by:

- **The EU:** As “free and fair elections” was one of the main pre-conditions for continuation of the EU accession of Georgia (4th* out of 9 main not fulfilled conditions), the **EU could start an investigation to determine whether the election process was “free and fair”** in order to confirm or deny the claim of the government in this regard. According to observer reports, both international and local, free and fair election process was not guaranteed and no election observation report qualifies the October 24 Parliamentary elections as such.
- **The U.S.:** Considering numerous proofs of voting violations in Georgia, including violation of vote secrecy, which shows the flawed election process and improper use of electronic voting machines produced by Smartmatic, **the US could start an investigation including through conducting an IT and technical audits of voting machines as well as voting equipment (such as markers).** The Central Election Commission ordered voting machines with specifications such as USB modules, no face recognition or fingerprint modules, even though the machines do have such functions. The above-mentioned specific requests by the CEC should have been an indication for the machine producing company that the usage of their machines could have served the purpose of election rigging.
- **Joint US-EU: Investigation with the objective to verify whether the elections were free and fair in Georgia** in order to make a decision regarding suspension or restoration of donor and International Financial Institution programs for Georgia (EBRD, WB, EIB, KfW,, USAID, SIDA and other).
- **Joint- US-EU: Investigation of Russian interference in Georgian elections aimed at election fraud and increase of Russian influence.** The outcome may influence the future of not only Georgia but of many other developing and developed countries. Russian managed election rigging experiment in Georgia needs to be investigated not only to restore election integrity in Georgia but also to prevent such cases in the future worldwide.

**Step 4: Ensure a free, fair and competitive electoral process, notably in 2024, and fully address OSCE/ODIHR recommendations. Finalise electoral reforms, including ensuring adequate representation of the electorate, well in advance of election day.*

Reactions by Strategic Partners

Summary

- Georgia's strategic partners expressed **concerns** regarding violations observed at the 2024 parliamentary elections, as the latter **has not been qualified as "free and fair"**.
- **It was underlined that violations took place not only during the elections day** (October 26), **but before the elections, contributing to polarized environment; changes in the electoral legislation** created grounds for election rigging.
- Developments during the whole election period were qualified as **democratic backsliding by the US President Joe Biden**.
- Disinformation narratives, frequent misuse of administrative resources, numerous and systemic violations, including **frequent compromise of vote secrecy, intimidation and pressure** on voters etc., **could not guarantee "free and fair" elections**.
- Georgia's partners have called for a **transparent investigation** of all election irregularities and violations.

Reactions by Strategic Partners

The US President Joe Biden's statement



On October 29, the the US President Joe Biden made a statement about 2024 parliamentary elections in Georgia, naming the resent developments in Georgia as a **democratic backsliding** and mentioning the following issues:

- **“Legislation mirroring Russian laws**, restricting fundamental freedoms and limiting the space for independent civil society organizations.”
- **“Parliamentary elections were marred by numerous recorded misuses of administrative resources as well as voter intimidation and coercion.”**
- The US President mentioned that **“independent international and domestic observers have not said that elections were free and fair”** and called Georgian government to **“transparently investigate all election irregularities**, “repeal laws such as so-called “Foreign Influence Law” and to begin an immediate, inclusive dialogue with all political forces in Georgia about restoring election integrity“.

Source: [The White House](#); 29.10.2024

European Commission (EC)



The report of the EC (November 30, 2024), assessing the implementation of recommended nine steps/priorities, outlines a number of issues and problems related to implementation of EU recommendations, including the recommendation on ensuring free, fair and competitive electoral process (step 4). The assessment of electoral process, among others, includes the following **issues**:

- **Deepened political polarization** particularly in the run-up to the 2024 parliamentary elections;
- **“Threats from leaders of the parliamentary majority towards opposition members and civil society representatives continued.”**
- **“Amendments to the Election Code disregarding** long-standing recommendations of the **Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR.”**
- **“Disinformation narratives have been disseminated and amplified by i.a. ruling party officials and government-affiliated media”**
- **“Frequent compromises on vote secrecy**, procedural inconsistencies.”
- **“Intimidation and pressure on voters** that negatively impacted public trust in the electoral process.”

Source: [EU Delegation to Georgia](#); 05.11.2024

Reactions by Strategic Partners



30 European politicians, namely members of the European Parliament and 19 national parliaments, call for international investigation into alleged election fraud

- On November 6, European countries known as the "Friends of Georgia" issued a joint statement **calling for an international inquiry into alleged electoral irregularities in Georgia** and for **sanctions** against Bidzina Ivanishvili and other officials responsible for the country's democratic backsliding.
- The signatories express concern over "unprecedented number of incidents and systemic violations reported by international observers", "recent democratic backsliding, including the enactment of anti-European legislation limiting the space for independent civil society organizations and human rights".
- The signatories demand that Georgian authorities **ensure transparent investigations** of "electoral manipulation (including, during the pre-election period), especially with regard to voter intimidation and vote buying".

Source: [Joint Statement](#); 06.11.2024

A joint statement by the leaders of the Weimar Triangle on the situation in Georgia



- In a joint statement published on November 7, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk expressed their concerns about the political situation in Georgia.
- As mentioned in the joint statement, **the leaders** of the three countries **expressed "great concern" about the parliamentary elections in Georgia**, based on the preliminary findings published by the international election observation mission.
- They call on the Georgian authorities to **transparently investigate the complaints**: "We call for prompt and transparent investigations to investigate all complaints and shed light on reported irregularities, and we will carefully examine the final report of the international observation mission, which must be delivered within the expected time frame."

Source: [Statement](#); 07.11.2024

Reactions by Strategic Partners

Statement of Helsinki Commission Chairman Rep. Joe Wilson



“I am troubled by the credible allegations of systematic violations in the Georgian parliamentary election. I am also disturbed by the well-documented efforts by Russia to sway the election.” Mr. Joe Wilson called on the State Department to investigate allegations of fraud in Georgian elections.

Source: [US Helsinki Commission](#); 27.11.2024

The President of the European Council, Charles Michel



“Regarding the conducted elections, there are serious suspicions of fraud, which require an investigation. We need clarity regarding this process to make sure that everything was conducted fairly and transparently”.

Source: [BMG media](#); 08.11.2024

Statement by the High Representative / Vice-President of the Commission Kaja Kallas and Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos

- **“This announcement marks shift from the policies of all previous Georgian governments and the European aspirations of the vast majority of the Georgian people, as enshrined in the Constitution of Georgia”.**
- **“The EU strongly condemns the violence against peaceful protesters, who are standing firm for their European and democratic future. These actions by the Georgian government have direct consequences on our relationship”.**
- **“The EU stands with the Georgian people and their choice for a European future. The door to the EU remains open and the return of Georgia to the European values and the EU accession path is in the hands of the Georgian leadership.”**

Source: [European Commission](#); 01.12.2024

Only a handful of countries, mostly Russian allies, have recognized the results of elections - Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, Iran, China, Venezuela, Nicaragua